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Amidst the general disappointment that accompanied last month’s world summit, 
there were several important rays of hope.  One of these, and perhaps in the 
longer-term the most important, was the General Assembly’s (GA) endorsement of 
the ‘responsibility to protect’.  One hundred and ninety one states committed 
themselves to the principle that the rule of non-intervention was not sacrosanct 
in cases where a government was committing genocide, mass killing and large-
scale ethnic cleansing within its borders.  Moreover, some state leaders boldly 
claimed that had such a declaration existed in 1994, this would have prevented 
the Rwandan genocide and the massacres a year later at Srebrenica.  For 
example, the United Kingdom’s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Jack Straw, 
stated in his speech to the Labour Party conference on 28 September that, ‘If this 
new responsibility had been in place a decade ago, thousands in Srebrenica and 
Rwanda would have been saved’.  This paper seeks to critically reflect on this 
claim by considering how far the GA’s adoption of the responsibility to protect 
significantly changes the parameters shaping humanitarian intervention in 
contemporary international society.  Here, I argue that the UN’s endorsement of 
this new norm fails to address the fundamental question of what should happen 
if the Security Council is unable or unwilling to authorise the use of force to 
prevent or end a humanitarian tragedy, and secondly, it fails to address the 
question of how this norm could be better implemented to save strangers in the 
future.   
The argument proceeds in three parts:  first, I consider the genesis of the 
‘responsibility to protect’ in the report produced by the Canadian sponsored 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).  Here, I 
argue that what was imaginative about the ICISS report, entitled The 
Responsibility to Protect, was that it tentatively suggested ways for the UN to act 
when the Council could not agree on collective action.  Unfortunately, none of the 
key recommendations in the report were taken up, and I consider how far this 
reflected the US and UK invocation of humanitarian justifications over 
Afghanistan and especially Iraq which was widely seen as discrediting the notion 
of the responsibility to protect.  The second part of the paper examines how the 
idea of the responsibility to protect moved from the margins to gain endorsement 
by the GA.  I argue that three factors were crucial in explaining this change: first, 
the ideas in the ICISS report were taken up positively by the Secretary General’s 
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High-Level Panel on ‘Threats, Challenges and Change’ which reported to Kofi 
Annan in December 2004.  The High-Level Panel broke with ICISS by omitting 
any discussion of what should happen if the Security Council was unable or 
unwilling to act.  This enabled it to secure a consensus among those members of 
the panel who were most sensitive about eroding state sovereignty.  The High-
Level Panel shared the Canadian sponsored Commission’s enthusiasm for 
reaching an agreement on the criteria that should govern the use of force, and 
this idea was taken up by Annan in his major report ‘in larger freedom’ which set 
out a detailed blueprint for UN reform.  However, this part of the reform package 
was a casualty of the negotiations in New York which took place in the run-up to 
the world summit.  But once the responsibility to protect was decoupled from an 
agreement on criteria, many developing states which were nervous about agreeing 
to an idea that they worried might legitimise great power interventionism in the 
internal affairs of weaker states, dropped their reservations and were prepared to 
sign up to the responsibility to protect.  Finally, there is some evidence that those 
who were most opposed to the idea were increasingly persuaded that they could 
use the language in the summit declaration to undermine efforts to promote 
intervention at the UN.  In other words, far from enabling intervention, it seems 
that some governments saw the GA’s endorsement as an important mechanism 
for constraining the use of force.   
The final part of the paper considers the limits of the responsibility to 
protect in terms of questions of authority and political will by focusing on the 
difficulties of reaching agreement in the Council in cases where the preventive 
use of force is being considered, and in situations where there is no political will 
to act.   
 
ICISS and the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ 
The idea of the ‘responsibility to protect’ was first explicitly articulated in the 
report produced by the ICISS.  Set up at Lloyd Axworthy’s initiative, the 
Commission sought to develop a new normative framework that would ensure 
that there were no more Rwandas and no more Kosovos.  Here, it was responding 
to Kofi Annan’s plea that the UN avoid future situations where the Security 
Council was united but ineffective as over Rwanda, and where it was divided, and 
particular states acted without express Council authorisation as over Kosovo.  
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The report argued that the debate over sovereignty versus intervention should be 
re-framed in terms of the responsibility to protect.  States are entrusted with the 
primary responsibility to protect the security of their citizens.  However, should 
they fail to exercise this responsibility, then ‘the principle of non-intervention 
yields to the international responsibility to protect’.1  The report declared that, 
‘[t]he most compelling task now is to work to ensure that when the call goes out 
to the community of states for action, that call will be answered. There must 
never again be mass killing or ethnic cleansing. There must be no more 
Rwandas’.2  The Commission viewed their report as: 
 
• Contributing to the generation of the political will necessary to avoid future 
Rwandas. 
• Bridging the divide between West and South in relation to contending 
claims of human rights versus sovereign rights by moving debate away 
from the legal right of states to intervene and towards the international 
responsibility to protect the victims of humanitarian crises. 
• Establishing threshold principles – large scale killing and ethnic cleansing – 
and precautionary ones (right intention, last resort, proportional means 
and reasonable prospect of success) to govern when intervention was 
permissible. 
 
The ICISS argued that the task was to make the Council work better, and 
proposed that the P-5 agree not to exercise the veto in cases where there is 
majority support for a resolution authorising the use of force to prevent or end a 
humanitarian catastrophe. 
Most governments were positive at the declaratory level, but no substantive 
progress was made on implementing its key recommendation that the General 
Assembly and Security Council endorse the idea of the ‘responsibility to protect’ 
and adopt the threshold and precautionary principles in the report.  There was no 
support from the permanent five (P-5) for agreed limits on the veto (France was 
the most enthusiastic here), and whilst some developing states welcomed a 
greater role for the General Assembly, there was no question of the P-5 agreeing 
to this. 
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Supporters of the report blamed the attempts to justify the Iraq war in 
humanitarian terms as responsible for the limited progress that was made in 
implementing its key recommendations.  For example, Gareth Evans, co-chair of 
the Commission – and an influential member of the High-Level Panel - argued in 
May 2004 that the ‘poorly and inconsistently’ argued humanitarian justification 
for the war has ‘almost choked at birth what many were hoping was an emerging 
new norm justifying intervention on the basis of the principle of the 
“responsibility to protect”’.3  The worry was that the misuse of humanitarian 
arguments by America, and especially the UK, would reinforce long-standing 
suspicions on the part of many Southern states that a doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention would be a weapon used by the strong against the weak.4  With the 
benefit of hindsight, it is evident that Evans was being overly pessimistic, but his 
assessment appeared accurate at the time, and this begs the question as to what 
explains the change in attitudes that led governments at the summit to sign up to 
the responsibility to protect.   
 
From the High-Level Panel to the 2005 Declaration  
The first factor that significantly changed the normative context was Annan’s 
decision to convene the High-Level panel.  One important consequence of the 
divisions in the Council over Iraq was Annan’s commissioning of fifteen highly 
experienced representatives from North and South to examine how the UN could 
be reformed to meet the new security challenges of the 21st century.  Its report ‘A 
more secure world: our shared responsibility’ takes as its point of departure the 
core assumption in the ICISS report that state and human security are 
indivisible, and that it is to collective action by states that we have to look to 
address the myriad of threats facing humanity.  The High-level Panel proposed 
that the UN should adopt the emerging norm of the responsibility to protect in 
cases of ‘genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious 
violations of international law’.  It also recommended that the Council reach 
agreement on the criteria determining the use of force, and proposed the following 
principles: Seriousness of Threat; proper purpose; last resort; proportional means; 
and Reasonable Chance of Success.  The fact that Russian and Chinese 
representatives on the High-Level Panel were prepared to accept such language, 
when their governments had opposed British attempts in 1999-2000 to reach 
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agreement on criteria in the Council, reflected the strength of arguments being 
mobilised by key members of the panel, crucially Evans and the British 
representative Lord David Hannay,  It was also crucially dependent upon the 
High-Level Panel’s explicit statement that the use of force would have to be 
authorised by the Council under its Chapter VII provisions.  It was this criterion 
that the UK had refused to accept in negotiations over criteria in the Council, 
believing that such a constraint would bind the UK and its Western allies in 
future cases where consideration was being given to using force without express 
Council authorisation, as had happened over Kosovo. 
What is highly innovative about the High-level Panel report is the 
proposition that the Council has the authority – and indeed the responsibility – to 
use force preventively to uphold international peace and security.  This was a 
ground-breaking development because it enables the Council to adopt resolutions 
that authorise coercive action, including ultimately the use of force, to prevent 
humanitarian crises from worsening.  The Secretary General warmly welcomed 
the report of the High-Level Panel, and he included all its proposals related to the 
responsibility to protect and the use of force into ‘in larger freedom’ which was 
distributed in March 2005 for discussion within the GA in the run-up to the 
September summit.  Moreover, in taking up the ideas of the panel, Annan clearly 
included prevention of genocide and ethnic cleansing in his definition of what 
counts as a threat to ‘international peace and security’.5    
On the question of criteria, the Secretary General is an enthusiast.  He 
wrote in ‘in larger freedom’ that if the Council could reach agreement on the 
principles set out in the report of the High-Level, this would ‘add transparency to 
[Council] deliberations and makes its decisions more likely to be respected, by 
both governments and world public opinion’.6  Implicit in this contention is the 
assumption that if the Council agreed on criteria, this would enable it to reach 
agreement in future cases where the issue of intervention was contested.  The 
question as to whether agreement on principles determining the use of force 
would generate Council unity in future cases is a moot one since this part of the 
reform package was rejected during the negotiations in New York.   
Even before the political fall-out from Iraq, there was little enthusiasm in 
the Council for new guidelines on intervention.  The British attempt, led by the 
then Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, to press this issue in the aftermath of Kosovo 
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failed to gain significant support.  The United States strongly opposed such 
efforts, concerned that guidelines might either restrict its freedom of manoeuvre 
or push it into actions that it was reluctant to undertake.  China and Russia were 
also opposed, worrying that guidelines might open the door to greater UN 
interventionism in the internal affairs of Member States.7  These basic positions 
have not changed, and if anything, they have hardened: for states like China, 
India and Russia, all too conscious of the massive disequilibrium in global power, 
it is vital that nothing be done that further restrict the UN Charter’s restraints on 
the use of force.  Equally, the United States remains opposed to any guidelines 
that might constrain its freedom of action when it comes to the use of force.8  The 
combined opposition of these states killed any attempt to develop agreed 
guidelines at the summit.   
The principal argument against the Council adopting criteria is that it will 
enable powerful states to circumvent Council authority.9  However, this 
proposition is open to the powerful rebuttal that agreement on thresholds would 
actually constrain the use of force.  The best argument for establishing specific 
principles is that it makes it harder for states to employ bogus humanitarian 
claims, since each government is required to defend its actions in terms of the 
specific criteria.10  As Gareth Evans put it, ‘[a]t the end of the day strong 
arguments will look stronger and weak arguments weaker, and these 
appearances do matter’.11  Those governments which fail to present a persuasive 
case to other governments, the media and wider world public opinion risk being 
condemned and even sanctioned.12  I am not arguing that criteria would eliminate 
the risk of abuse, but agreement on the principles set out in both the High-Level 
Panel report and ‘in larger freedom’ would establish a clear benchmark against 
which to judge the humanitarian claims of states.   
The refusal of Russia, China, and the United States to discuss criteria was 
not accompanied by a rejection of the idea of the responsibility to protect.  There 
was a significant body of international opinion led by the EU, Canada and other 
concerned states that worked hard in the months before the summit to reassure 
those developing states who were nervous and hesitant about endorsing the 
responsibility to protect.  The success of these efforts was that member states 
accepted for the first time in the final outcome document that ‘collective action’ 
could be taken using ‘Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation 
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with relevant regional organisations…should peaceful means be inadequate and 
national authorities are manifestly failing to protect populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’.13  A small group of 
developing states (Pakistan and Egypt were important players here) led by China 
and India fought against inclusion of this idea.  But in the end, having failed to 
gain significant support, they reluctantly agreed to sign up to the principle.  It 
was crucial for these states that during the negotiations it was agreed to move the 
statement on the responsibility to protect out of the section dealing with the use 
of force and into the one concerning human rights and the rule of law.  There was 
also a sense that none of these states wanted to be seen as responsible for 
preventing an agreed outcome at the summit, and in the case of China, it seems 
that it was prepared to trade-off its opposition to the responsibility to protect in 
return for greater concessions on the idea of a human rights council which it 
strongly opposes.   
The third factor which seems to have smoothed the passage of the summit 
declaration is that those governments which are reluctant about humanitarian 
intervention are increasingly persuaded that the language of the responsibility to 
protect could be used to constrain rather than enable interventions.  In this 
regard, it is important that the paragraph in the summit communiqué before the 
one dealing specifically with responsibility to protect states that, ‘[e]ach individual 
State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’.14  Alex Bellamy shows in his 
forthcoming article on Darfur how those states which opposed applying sanctions 
against the Government of Sudan argued in Council deliberations during 2004 
that the responsibility rested firstly with states, and that in the case of Darfur, 
the crisis had not yet reached the point where it was reasonable to argue that 
Sudan is failing in its responsibilities.15  It remains to be seen how far states are 
enabled to avoid their obligations by employing this type of argument in future 
cases.  Certainly, the hope of those who have pushed for the adoption of the 
responsibility to protect at the UN is that the agreement in the final outcome 
document will make it much harder for states to hide behind the shield of 




The Limits of the Responsibility to Protect 
Without detracting from the success of what was achieved in New York in terms 
of gaining a new acceptance of the responsibility to protect, there are two critical 
limits to what has been achieved.  The first is that the agreement in paragraph 
one hundred and thirty nine of the outcome document does nothing to address 
the fundamental problem of political will.  Those media commentators who have 
trumpeted the agreement on the responsibility to protect imply that the barrier to 
humanitarian intervention has been the principle of non-intervention.16  This 
belief is shared by those state leaders who have pushed this idea at the UN.  For 
example, I noted earlier Foreign Secretary Straw’s comment that had the 
responsibility to protect been in place in 1994, the Rwandan genocide would have 
been averted.  The problem with this reading of history is that the fundamental 
barrier to intervention in Rwanda - as Annan acknowledged in a 1999 report to 
the GA – was lack of political will.17  No state opposed intervention in Rwanda on 
grounds of sovereignty, and had any state, or group of states, sought a mandate 
from the Security Council to use force in April and May 1994, it is virtually 
inconceivable that this would have been opposed.  Thus, the real test of the 
summit declaration on the responsibility to protect is whether it increases the 
likelihood of the Council mustering the political will to act to prevent and halt 
future humanitarian crises.  The continuing failure to respond both effectively 
and quickly to the humanitarian emergency in Darfur suggests that declaratory 
commitments to the principle of the responsibility to protect are not backed up by 
the political will to save strangers in peril.   
 The second problem with what was agreed in New York is that it does 
nothing to address the fundamental problem of what should happen if the 
Council is unable to agree in cases where particular states are seeking a mandate 
or prevent or stop a humanitarian emergency.  In the case of Darfur, for example, 
the implication of the current position is that if a majority of the Council 
supported a request for authorisation from a coalition of Western and African 
states seeking to end the atrocities, and this was opposed by one or more of the 
permanent members, then this would be the end of the matter.  Few will be 
satisfied with this outcome, since each of us can imagine circumstances in which 
we would support moral imperatives trumping the legal prerogatives of the UN 
Charter.  Some Western governments are prepared to support military action to 
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stop slaughter and suffering if the Council fails to exercise its responsibilities.  
This is most likely to occur because one of the five permanent members of the 
Council (P-5) uses its veto, but it is possible to imagine circumstances in which 
there is insufficient support for a resolution authorising the use of force to end a 
humanitarian crisis.  For others, notably Russia, China and India, bypassing the 
Council undermines international law and sets dangerous precedents which 
others might emulate.  
The difficulty is that states can sign up to the principle of the responsibility 
to protect but disagree over its application in particular cases.  The problem of 
Council unity is unlikely to arise in cases where there is clear-cut evidence of 
genocide and mass killing (unless one of the P-5 has a vital interest at stake), but 
if military intervention occurs at this point, it will come far too late for many.  It is 
highly significant that the summit declaration recognises that the Council has the 
right to authorise the preventive use of force in relation to humanitarian 
protection, but what it ignores is that securing a consensus that force should be 
used to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe is fraught with difficulty.  The 
fundamental dilemma in using force in response to warning indicators of an 
impending disaster is that it can never be known whether intervention is justified; 
we can never have access to the counter-factual of what would happen if the 
intervention did not take place.  Robert Legvold captures the dilemma of 
legitimating anticipatory humanitarian intervention: ‘To wait until massive 
numbers of lives have been lost before acting will…compound the tragedy…Yet, to 
reach agreement on forceful action in response to warning signs before tragedy 
strikes promises to be difficult in the extreme, if the evidence is ambiguous, as it 
is likely to be, and if a sizable number of states, including major powers like 
Russia, China and India, start from a strong bias against intervention’.18  The 
only case to date of this kind was Kosovo.  The reason why the latter was such a 
difficult one for the Council was because there were genuine differences of 
opinion among the P-5 over whether force was the right means to end the crisis.  
NATO claimed that it had credible evidence that the Milosevic government was 
planning to forcibly expel the Kosovars, and this was supported by a majority of 
states on the Council which accepted that the humanitarian necessities of the 
situation justified the use of force.  However, Russia and China argued that 
diplomacy should have been given more time.  Had the human rights crisis in 
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Kosovo worsened along the lines predicted by NATO, Russia’s position might have 
changed in the Council.  It accepted that the Yugoslav Government was 
committing gross abuses of international humanitarian law, and had voted in 
support of Resolution 1199 and abstained on Resolution 1203.  The difficulty 
with this line of argument is how many Kosovars had to be killed - or be expelled 
- before Russia and China would have sanctioned military action.  The burden of 
justification that falls on states launching anticipatory interventions is far greater 
than would be the case if the humanitarian catastrophe had already happened, 
since the risks of abuse are greatest in relation to such preventive actions.   
It was the need to avoid divisions in the Council, such as arose over Kosovo 
that was a key motivation behind the setting up of ICISS.  NATO’s unilateralism 
over Kosovo demonstrates that Western governments are not prepared to always 
wait for Council authorisation when they believe that the preventive use of force 
is necessary to protect endangered peoples.  In such situations, the real question 
is: who is acting irresponsibly, those who seek to end the killings in the absence 
of a clear UN mandate or those who argue that such actions break international 
law and hence undermine the rules restricting the use of force.  To its credit, the 
ICISS report recognised that this question could not be ducked, and it suggested 
the following procedural mechanisms be employed: states must always request 
Council authorisation before acting (NATO failed this test over Kosovo); the P-5 
should agree not to exercise the veto (unless vital interests were threatened) in 
cases where a resolution supporting military intervention to end a humanitarian 
crisis has majority support (this was not specified but it was understood that this 
meant securing at least 9 votes); and if the veto is exercised in such cases, 
recourse might be made to the General Assembly under the ‘Uniting for Peace’ 
resolution and/or to regional bodies.  It is a fascinating counterfactual question 
as to whether NATO would have secured majority support in the Council had it 
followed these procedures over Kosovo, and whether in the event of a Russian or 
Chinese veto, a resolution supporting military action prior to the commencement 
of hostilities would have elicited a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly. 
The proposal in the ICISS report for limiting the veto was too controversial 
for the High-level Panel, and it was also omitted from ‘in larger freedom’.  There 
was no discussion of alternatives to the Council in any of the formal negotiations 
in New York, and had this been raised, it would have derailed any agreement on 
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the responsibility to protect.  Consequently, six years later, it is not evident that 
the UN is any better placed to cope with a future Kosovo where the Council is 
divided on the merits of preventive action.  There are grounds for some guarded 
optimism in relation to the prevention of future Rwandas, since the hope must be 
that by signing up to the responsibility to protect, governments – especially 
Council members - will find it harder to evade their new declaratory commitment 
to protect endangered populations.  However, if this does not translate into 
greater political will to use force in extreme cases of humanitarian emergency, 
rhetorical commitments to the responsibility to protect are likely to be seen as 
hollow, and the concept could become discredited for years to come.  It is the 
responsibility of all of us to avoid this outcome by holding our representatives at 
the UN to the fine words they have signed up to so that future generations can 
look back at the 2005 summit as marking a decisive victory for the responsibility 
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